Capitalism at War: Case Study of Corporate Self-Sanctions in Russia in 2022-2025

Abstract

This thesis examines how multinational corporations (MNCs), acting primarily on their own initiative, can condition state sovereignty through coordinated withdrawal. Using a qualitative single-case study of Russia from February 2022 to mid-2025, it traces how audience pressure, reputational concerns, and control over capabilities turned corporate decisions into political constraints. The analysis draws on triangulated secondary sources, including the Kyiv School of Economics “Leave Russia” database, Yale CELI firm-level timelines, company filings synthesized by major newswires, and Russian official documentation. Process tracing focuses on four steps: audience activation, corporate exit, capability denial, and host-state countermeasures. The evidence indicates that many early departures happened without legal compulsion and were concentrated in activities that depend on proprietary standards and after‑sales support that are hard to replace. Underperformance after ownership transfers, together with a smaller tax base from foreign firms, points to effects that are likely to persist. Politically, the Russian state relied on discretionary instruments, including approval regimes, mandatory discounts and exit contributions, and temporary administration or seizure, which preserved shortterm control deepening dependence on a narrower set of non-Western partners. Interpreted through constructivism, complex interdependence, and private authority, the case demonstrates how norms violations and private choices narrow a state’s feasible policy set without altering juridical status. The analysis is limited by its reliance on secondary sources and by status categories that cannot capture every nuance of firm behavior. The study contributes a mechanism-focused account of corporate self-sanction as emergent governance and identifies conditions under which similar dynamics are likely to recur.